Struggling for democracy in Venezuela

By Angel E. Alvarez, Ph.D.

Venezuela is a paradox. After forty years enjoying an exceptionally stable electoral democracy, in a region plagued by military dictatorships, the country has been ruled for seventeen years by an electoral-authoritarian government whereas the rest of Latin America experiences a rebirth of democracy. The country with the highest proven oil reserves in the world, which enjoyed record-high prices for more than a decade, is now sunk in misery and amid a dangerous humanitarian and political crisis.  

Until five years ago, the Chavista revolution surprised the world with announcements of social achievements and high electoral successes. Chavez claimed to have reduced poverty at the lowest levels in the world, through social programs offering both equity and democratic political participation. Venezuela was awarded by the FAO for reaching the Millennium Development Goals on food. The former coup leader boasted about the success of his socialist revolution through electoral means.  

But Chavez’s socialism engines fed on expensive oil. With the fall of oil prices, the intrinsic inefficiencies of the economic model became evident.  Chavez's government replaced the national industry by subsidized imports. To this end, the government used a monetary policy of currency overvaluation. At the same time, an expansionary economic policy stimulated aggregated demand and inflation. In this context, Chavez tried unsuccessfully to impose an inefficient system of state-owned enterprises and collectively owned firms, based on forced nationalizations and arbitrary confiscations. All this eventually led to a severe contraction of domestic and external private investment. However, with high oil prices none of these failures affected the popularity of populist caudillo. 

Maduro administration inherited Chavez’s inefficiencies. The inflation rate is about 700 % and the risk of hyperinflation rises.  International liquid reserves are falling at a very fast rate and they currently are at a very critical level. Unemployment has climbed from 7% in 2015 to 30% during the last quarter.  Economic growth has been negative for more than two years. The country already is in an undeclared commercial default and the risk of financial default is higher than never before.  

Thousands of citizens die for not having access to healthcare, but the government refuses to accept the existence of the humanitarian crisis. Shortages of essential goods keep consumers for hours a day in long lines at bakeries, pharmacies, grocery stores and supermarkets, both those owned by the government and the few remaining in private hands. A presidential decree on job security allows workers to be absent for several days during which line up to buy price-controlled goods. Some of them are resold in the black market, as a way for workers to offset their precarious wages.  

Caracas, which in the past was called "a branch of Heaven" by its inhabitants, has become one of the most dangerous cities on the planet. The unpunished crime correlates with a frightening average of two to three lynching or very severe mistreatment of criminal suspects by week. Tens of thousands of Venezuelans have been victims of kidnappings and extortion. More than a hundred Venezuelans are murdered each week in the streets and even in their homes. About 92 percent of crimes remain in impunity.  Police raids are both inefficient and made in blatant violation of human rights. Social violence is part of daily life for most citizens. There are daily protests against the government for lack of food, medicines, and interruption of water and electric power services, but also a wave of lootings and food riots.  

In the midst of such a crisis of tragic dimensions, Venezuelans’ reactions are threefold. Some citizens overwhelmed by the dramatic situation of the country sees no alternative but to leave the country. Another group, small but not negligible, resignedly hopes that someday the socialist promises come true. The third group is deeply discontent with the government and still bets on peaceful and electoral changes.  Between 2010 and 2014, the number of Venezuelans who left the country seeking refuge or political asylum was, on average, about 100. Between 2015 and 2016, this figure has risen outrageously. Only in March 2016, more than 1,500 Venezuelans sought asylum in any country in the world. The number may tend to increase. 

The second group of Venezuelans supports Maduro, even though they are not satisfied with the government. About 40 % of voters in December 2015 remained loyal to the candidates of the ruling party. However, nowadays, Maduro has the backing of 24 percent of the electorate. This figure is surprisingly high, given its dismal performance. The rest, the majority, rejects the government but has managed to remain faithful to the opposition strategy of democratization through elections. 

However, the government is increasingly less willing to allow new elections. The clear victory of the Democratic Unity in 2015 was canceled in practice. The Executive flouted its decisions and Supreme Court, packed by Maduro’s party, systematically has overruled the laws enacted by the legislature. The government has threatened to close the Assembly and does not transfer the financial resources necessary for its operation. The National Electoral Council, controlled by the government, makes illegal obstacles to opposition attempts to convene a presidential recall referendum. 

The opposition seeks to twist the arm of the headstrong Electoral Council putting pressure on the streets. The opposition coalition tries to escalate the conflict by demonstrations and rallies that may become massive and frequent. As has happened in the past, civic protests will be suppressed by the military, the national police, and armed civilian groups (the so-called "collective " ). It is unclear whether the opposition coalition will achieve the electoral solution to the conflict. Government leaders have much to lose—political power is not the only thing at stake. The final word may say noncivilian factors of power within the state, particularly those responsible for administering violent repression. Meanwhile, everything is uncertain about the Venezuelan future. Let’s wait and see.

Angel E. Alvarez holds an MA and Ph. D. from the department of government at the University of Notre Dame, USA. He is a political scientist, professor emeritus, policy consultant, and political advisor.  He is a published author of several books and journal articles on Latin American politics.  Currently, Professor Alvarez has been an advisor on drug policy for multilateral organizations (OAS and PAHO). He is also an expert on electoral politics and global political economy.  He has worked as a policy analyst for Latin American governments for more than a decade.